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Abstract
We introduce a new class of games called the networked common goods game (NCGG), which
generalizes the well-known common goods game [12]. We focus on a fairly general subclass
of the game where each agent’s utility functions are the same across all goods the agent is
entitled to and satisfy certain natural properties (diminishing return and smoothness). We give
a comprehensive set of technical results listed as follows.
• We show the optimization problem faced by a single agent can be solved efficiently in
this subclass. The discrete version of the problem is however NP-hard but admits a fully
polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
• We show uniqueness results of pure strategy Nash equilibrium of NCGG, and that the
equilibrium is fully characterized by the structure of the network and independent of the
choices and combinations of agent utility functions.
• We show NCGG is a potential game, and give an implementation of best/better response
Nash dynamics that lead to fast convergence to an ǫ-approximate pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
• Lastly, we show the price of anarchy of NCGG can be as large as Ω(n1−ǫ) (for any ǫ > 0),
which means selfish behavior in NCGG can lead to extremely inefficient social outcomes.
1 Introduction
A collection of members belong to various communities. Each member belongs to one or more
communities to which she can make contributions, either monetary or in terms of service but subject
to a budget, and in turn benefits from contributions made by other members of the communities.
The extent to which a member benefits from a community is a function of the collective contributions
made by the members of this community.
A collection of collaborators are collaborating on various projects. Each collaborator is collab-
orating on one or more projects and each project has one or more collaborators. Each collaborator
comes with certain endowment of resources, in terms of skills, time and energy, that she can allocate
across the projects on which she is collaborating. The extent to which a project is successful is a
function of the resources collectively allocated to it by its collaborators, and each of its collaborator
in turn derives a utility from the successfulness of the project.
A collection of friends interact with each other, and friendships are reinforced through mutual
interactions or weakened due to the lack of them. The more time and effort mutually devoted by
two friends in their friendship, the stronger the friendship is; the stronger the friendship is, the
more each benefit from it. However, each friend is constrained by her time and energy and has to
decide how much to devote to each of her friends.
Suppose the community members, the collaborators and the friends (which we collectively call
agents) are all self-interested and interested in allocating their limited resources in a way that
maximizes their own total utility derived from the communities, projects, and mutual friendships
(which we collectively call goods) that they have access to. Interesting computational and economics
questions abound: Can the agents efficiently find optimal ways to allocate their resources? Viewed
as a game played by the agents over a bipartite network, how does the network structure affect
the game? In particular, does there exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? Is it unique and will
myopic and selfish behaviors of the agents lead to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? And how
costly are these myopic and selfish behaviors?
In this paper we address these questions by first proposing a model that naturally captures
these strategic interactions, and then giving a comprehensive set of results to the scenario where
there is only one resource to be allocated by the agents, and the utility an agent derives from a
good to which she is entitled is a concave and smooth function of the total resource allocated to
that good. We start by giving our model that we call the networked common goods game (NCGG).
The Model. The networked common goods game is played on a bipartite graph G = (P,A,E),
where P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} is a set of goods and A = {a1, a2, ..., am} is a set of agents. If there
is an edge (pi, aj) ∈ E, then agent aj is entitled to good pi. There is a single kind of divisible
resource of which each agent is endowed with one unit (we note this is not a loss of generality
as our results generalize easily to the case where different agents start with different amounts of
resource). Moreover, we can assume Nature has endowed each common good pi with αi amount of
resource that we call the ground level ; this can be viewed as modelling pi as having access to some
external sources of contributions.
Let N (v) denote the set of neighbors of a node v ∈ P ∪ A, xij ∈ [0, 1] the amount of resource
agent aj contribute to good pi and ωi = αi +
∑
ak∈N (pi)
xik the total amount of resource allocated
to good pi. Each agent aj derives certain utility Uj(ωi) from each pi of which she is a member.
We always assume Uj(0) = 0 and for the most part of the paper, we consider the case where Uj(·)
is increasing, concave and differentiable. Being self-interested, agent aj is interested in allocating
her resources across the goods to which she is entitled in a way that maximizes her total utility∑
pi∈N (aj)
Uj(ωi).
Our Results. We first consider the optimization problem faced by a single agent: Given the
resources already allocated to the goods to which agent aj is entitled, find a way to allocate
resource so that aj ’s total utility is maximized. We call this the common goods problem (CGP)
and consider both continuous and discrete versions, where the agent’s resource is either infinitely
divisible or atomic.
• We show that for the continuous version, if Uj(·) is assumed to be increasing, concave and
differentiable, then CGP has an analytical solution. On the other hand, the discrete version
of CGP is NP-hard but admits an FPTAS.
We then turn to investigate the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibrium of
NCGG1. We consider two concepts of uniqueness of equilibrium, among which strong uniqueness
is the standard concept of equilibrium uniqueness whereas weak uniqueness is defined as follows:
For any two equilibria E and E ′ of the game and for any good pi ∈ P , the total amount of resource
allocated to pi is the same under both E and E ′. We have the following results.
• We show for any NCGG instance, a Nash equilibrium always exists. And we show that this
Nash equilibrium is weakly unique not only in a particular NCGG instance, but across all
NCGG instances played on the same network as long as the utility function of each agent
is increasing, concave and differentiable. And if in addition the underlying graph is a tree,
1Since we concern ourself with only pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this paper, we use it interchangeably with
Nash equilibrium.
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the equilibrium is strongly unique. Our results do not assume that different agents have
the same utility function; this demonstrates that Nash equilibrium in NCGG is completely
characterized by network structure.
We also consider the convergence of Nash dynamics of the game, and its price of anarchy : The
worst-case ratio between the social welfare of an optimal allocation of resources and that of a Nash
equilibrium [17].
• We show that NCGG is a potential game, a concept introduced in [16], therefore any (bet-
ter/best response) Nash dynamics always converge to the (unique) pure strategy Nash equi-
librium. We then propose a particular implementation of Nash dynamics that leads to fast
convergence to a state that is an additive ǫ-approximation of the pure strategy Nash equi-
librium of NCGG. The convergence takes O(Kmn) time, where K = maxj U−1j (ǫ/n), which
for most reasonable choices of Uj is a polynomial of n and m. (For example, for Uj(x) = xp
where p ∈ (0, 1) is a constant, it is sufficient to set K = (n/ǫ)1/p, which is a polynomial in n.)
• We show the price of anarchy of the game is Ω(n1−ǫ) (for any ǫ > 0), which means selfish
behavior in this game can lead to extremely inefficient social outcomes, for a reason that
echoes the phenomenon of tragedy of the commons [11].
We note that NCGG introduced in this paper has the particularly nice property that very
little is assumed about agents’ utility functions. Unlike most economic models considered in the
literature where not only a particular form of utility function is assumed about a particular agent,
but very often the same utility function is imposed across all agents, so that the model remains
mathematically tractable, our model do not assume more than the following: 1) Uj(0) = 0; 2) Uj(·)
has diminishing return (increasing and convex); 3) Uj(·) is smooth (differentiable). In particular,
we do not need to assume different agents share a common utility function for our results to go
through.
Related Work. The networked common goods game we consider is a natural generalization of the
well-known common goods game [12]. Bramoulle´ and Kranton considered a different generalization
of the common goods game to networks [3]. In their formulation a (general, non-bipartite) network
is given where each node represents an agent ai, who can exert certain amount of effort ei ∈ [0,+∞)
towards certain common good and such effort incurs a cost of cei on the part of the agent, for some
constant c. ai’s effort directly benefits another agent aj iff they are directed connected in the
network, and the utility of ai is defined as Ui(ei +
∑
aj∈N (i)
ej) − cei. Bramoulle´ and Kranton
then analyze this model to yield the following interesting insights: First, in every network there is
an equilibrium where some individuals contribute whereas others free ride. Second, specialization
can be socially beneficial. And lastly, a new link in the network can reduce social welfare as it
can provide opportunities to free ride and thus reduce individual incentives to contribute. We note
both the model and the research perspectives are very different from those considered in this paper.
A more closely related model is that studied by Fol’gardt [8, 9]. The author considered a resource
allocation game played on a bipartite graph that is similar to our setting. In Fol’gardt’s model,
each agent has certain amount of discrete resources, each of unit volume, that she can allocate
across the ‘sites’ that she has access to. Each site generates certain utility for the agent, depending
on the resources jointly allocated to it by all its adjacent agents. In Fol’gardt’s formulation, each
agent is interested in maximizing the minimum utility obtained from a single site she has access
to. The analysis of Fol’gardt’s resource allocation game is limited to very specific and small graphs
[8, 9].
A variety of other models proposed and studied in the literature bear similarities to the net-
worked common goods game considered here. These include Fisher’s model of economy [7], the
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bipartite exchange economy [13, 4], the fixed budget resource allocation game [6, 18], the Pari-
Mutuel betting as a method of aggregating subjective probabilities [5], and the market share game
[10]. However these model all differ significantly in the ways allocations yield utility.
2 The Common Goods Problem
Recall that CGP is the optimization problem faced by a single agent: An agent has access to n
goods, each good pi has already been allocated αi ≥ 0 resources. The agent has certain amount of
resource to allocate across the n goods. Denote by xi (i = 1, ..., n) the amount of resource the agent
allocates to goods i, she receives a total utility of
∑n
i=1 U(αi+xi). In this section, we consider two
versions of this optimization problem, where the resource is either infinitely divisible or discrete.
2.1 Infinitely Divisible Resource
Without loss of generality, assume the agent has access to one unit of resource. In the infinitely
divisible case, CGP is a convex optimization problem captured by the following convex program.
maximize
∑n
i=1 U(αi + xi)
subject to
∑n
i=1 xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, ..., n)
(1)
where the constraint
∑n
i=1 xi = 1 comes from the observation that U(·) is an increasing function
so an optimal solution must have allocated the entire unit of resource.
As it turns out, as long as U(·) is increasing, concave and differentiable, the above convex
program admits exactly the same unique solution regardless of the particular choice of U(·). And
we note this solution coincides with what is known in the literature as the water-filling algorithm [2].
This is summarized in the following theorem. The proof relies on the above program being convex
to apply the well-known Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condition [2], and is relegated to
the appendix.
Theorem 1 For any utility function U that is concave and differentiable, the convex program
admits a unique analytical solution. Moreover, the solution is unique across all choices of U(·) as
long as it is increasing, concave and differentiable.
Therefore the unique optimal way to allocate resources across the goods is independent of the
agent’s utility function as long as it is differentiable and has diminishing return, which is a very
reasonable assumption. We note this is a particularly nice property of the model as it frees us
from imposing any particular form of utility function, which can often be arbitrary, and the risk of
observing artifacts thus introduced. In NCGG considered later, this property frees us from making
the assumption that each agent has the same utility function, which is standard of most economic
models whose absence would often render the underlying model intractable.
2.2 Discrete Resource
In the discrete case, the agent has access to a set of atomic resources, each of integral volume. We
show in the next two theorems that although the discrete CGP is NP-hard even in a rather special
case, the general problem always admits an FPTAS.
Theorem 2 The discrete common goods problem is NP-hard even when each atomic resource is of
unit volume and U(·) is increasing.
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Proof: We prove the hardness result by giving a reduction from the NP-hard unbounded knapsack
problem [15].
Unbounded Knapsack Problem (UKP)
Instance: A finite set U = {1, 2, ..., n} of items, each item i has value vi ∈ Z+, weight wi ∈ Z+
and unbounded supply, a positive integer B ∈ Z+.
Question: Find a multi-subset U ′ of U such that
∑
i∈U ′ vi is maximized and
∑
i∈U ′ wi ≤ B.
Since supply is unlimited we can assume without loss of generality that no two items are of the
same weight and no item is strictly dominated by any other item, i.e. wi > wj implies vi > vj .
Now create n goods, p1, ..., pn, where pi corresponds to item i and has a ground level (i − 1)B.
Let the agent have access to a total of B atomic resource, each of unit volume. Define the utility
function U(·) as follows: U(ω) =∑µ(ω)−1i=1 ⌊ Bwi ⌋vi + ⌊ ν(ω)wµ(ω) ⌋vµ(ω) + ω(n2−n+2)B2 where µ(ω) = ⌈ω/B⌉
and ν(ω) = ω mod B.
Clearly, U(·) is a strictly increasing function, and thus we only concern ourselves with those CGP
solutions that allocate all B atomic units of resources. One can then verify that there is a solution of
total value K to the UKP instance iff there is a solution of total utility
∑n
j=1
∑j−1
i=1
⌊
B
wi
⌋
vi+
1
2B +K
to the corresponding CGP instance. Therefore the discrete common goods problem is NP-hard.
Theorem 3 The discrete common goods problem always admits an FPTAS.
Proof: The discrete common goods problem can be reduced to the multiple-choice knapsack prob-
lem
Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem (MCKP)
Instance: A finite set U = {1, 2, ..., k} of items, each item i has value vi, weight wi and belongs
to one of n classes, a capacity B > 0.
Question: Find a subset U ′ of U such that
∑
i∈U ′ vi is maximized,
∑
i∈U ′ wi ≤ B, and at most
one item is chosen from each of the n classes.
The reduction goes as follows. For a general CGP instance, where there are B atomic unit-
volume resources, and goods {p1, ..., pn} such that good pi has ground level αi, create a MCKP
instance such that there are n classes c1, ..., cn. Class ci corresponds to good pi and has B items of
weight j and value U(αi + j), for j = 1, ..., B. The knapsack is of total capacity B.
It is not hard to see that there is a solution of total utility K to the CGP instance if and only if
there is a solution of total value K to the MCKP instance. Therefore, any approximation algorithm
for the latter translates into one for the former with the same approximation guarantee. Since an
FPTAS is known for MCKP [1, 14], CGP also admits an FPTAS.
3 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We consider in this section the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in NCGG.
3.1 The Existence of Nash Equilibrium
First we show a Nash equilibrium always exists in NCGG when the utility functions satisfy certain
niceness properties.
Theorem 4 For any NCGG instance, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists as long as Uj
is increasing, concave and differentiable for any agent aj .
5
Proof: Let deg(ai) be the degree of agent ai and D =
∑
ai∈A
deg(ai). Let s ∈ [0, 1]D be the
state vector that corresponds to how the m agents have allocated their resources, where the
(
∑i−1
k=1 deg(ak))th to the (
∑i
k=1 deg(ak))th dimension of s correspond to ai’s allocation of her
resource on the deg(ai) goods she is connected to (assume an arbitrary but fixed order of the goods
ai is connected to). Define function f : [0, 1]
D → [0, 1]D such that f(s) maps to the best response
state s′, where
(
s′∑i−1
k=1 deg(ak)
, ..., s′∑i
k=1 deg(ak)
)
corresponds to ai’s best response. Note s
′ is unique
because each agent ai’s best response is unique by Theorem 1, therefore f(s) is well-defined.
It is clear that [0, 1]D is compact (i.e. closed and bounded) and convex, and f is continuous.
Therefore, applying Brouwer’s fixed point theorem shows that f has a fixed point, which implies
NCGG has a Nash equilibrium.
We note on the other hand, it is easy to see that if Uj is allowed to be convex, then a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist in NCGG.
3.2 The Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
We next establish uniqueness results of Nash equilibrium of NCGG in the next two theorems.
Apparently, NCGG played on a general graph does not have a unique Nash equilibrium in the
standard sense: Consider for example the 2 × 2 complete bipartite graph where P = {p1, p2} and
A = {a1, a2}, for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, a1 (resp. a2) allocating δ (resp. 1 − δ) resource on p1 and
1 − δ (resp. δ) resource on p2 constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and therefore there
are uncountably infinite many of them. However, all these equilibria can still be considered as
equivalent to each other in the sense that they all allocate exactly the same amount of resource to
each good. And the reader is encouraged to verify as an exercise that any Nash equilibrium in the
above NCGG instance belongs to this equivalence class. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is still
unique, albeit in a weaker sense.
To capture this, we thus consider two concepts of uniqueness of equilibrium: We say an NCGG
instance has a weakly unique equilibrium if all its equilibria allocate exactly the same amount of
resource on each good pi. And if an NCGG instance has an equilibrium that is unique in the
standard sense, we call it strongly unique. We note the concept of weak uniqueness is a useful one
as it implies the uniqueness of each agent’s utility in equilibrium, which is really what we ultimately
care about.
We show two uniqueness results in this section. The first one establishes that NCGG has a
strongly unique Nash equilibrium if the underlying graph is a tree. The second one indicates that
it is not a coincidence that the example shown above has a weakly unique equilibrium — in fact, we
show any NCGG instance has a weakly unique Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, our results indicate
that the equilibrium is a function of the structure of the underlying graph only, and independent
of the particular forms and combinations of agents’ utility functions, as long as these functions are
increasing, concave and differentiable.
Theorem 5 The Nash equilibrium of NCGG is weakly unique across all networked common goods
games played on a given bipartite graph G = (P,A,E), as long as Uj is increasing, convex and
differentiable for any agent aj.
Proof: Suppose otherwise that there are two equilibria E and E ′ that have different amount of
resource ωi and ω
′
i allocated to some good pi (throughout the rest of the paper whenever it is clear
from the context, for any good px we denote by ωx and ω
′
x the amount of resource allocated to
px in E and E ′, respectively). Without loss of generality assume ω′i < ωi. Then there must exists
some agent aj ∈ N (pi) who is allocating less resource on pi in E ′ than in E , and as a result, aj
must be allocating more resource on some good pk ∈ N (aj)\{pi} in E ′ because in equilibrium each
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agent allocates all of its resources. The fact that aj is allocating nonzero resource on pi in E implies
ωi ≤ ωk, and for the same reason ω′k ≤ ω′i. Therefore we have ωk − ω′k ≥ ωi − ω′i > 0.
Now consider the following process: Starting from set S0 = {pi}, add goods to S0 that share
an agent with pi and whose total resource have decreased by at least ωi − ω′i in E ′; let the new set
be S1. Then grow the set further by adding goods that share an agent with some good in S1 and
whose total resource are reduced by at least ωi − ω′i in E ′. Continue this process until no more
goods can be added and let the resulting set be S. By construction every good in S has its total
resource decreased by at least ωi − ω′i in E ′ than in E ; in fact, it can be shown that the decrease is
exactly ωi − ω′i for each good in S.
If S = P , then we have a contradiction immediately because if each good in P has its total
resource decreased by a positive amount in E ′ then it implies the agents collectively have a positive
amount of resources not allocated, contradicting the fact that E ′ is a Nash equilibrium.
We now claim that indeed S = P . Suppose otherwise P = S ∪ T and T 6= ∅. Then, N (S), the
neighboring agents of S are collectively spending less resources on S in E ′ than in E , which implies
there exists an agent a ∈ N (S) who is allocating more resources to a good pt ∈ T in E ′ than in E
and less resources to a good ps ∈ S in E ′ than in E . By an argument similar to one given above,
we have ωs ≤ ωt and ω′t ≤ ω′s, and thus ωt − ω′t ≥ ωs − ω′s ≥ ωi − ω′i. This implies that pt should
be in S rather than T ; so we must have T = ∅ or S = P .
Therefore E and E ′ must be equivalent in the sense that for any good pi ∈ P , ωi = ω′i; this
allows us to conclude that the Nash equilibrium of NCGG on any graph is weakly unique.
Next, we move to establish the strong uniqueness result on trees. We need the following lemma
before we proceed to the main theorem of the section.
Lemma 1 For any instance of NCGG on a tree G = (P,A,E), let E be a Nash equilibrium of this
game, αi the ground level of pi ∈ P and ωi the total resource allocated on pi in E. For any other
instance of NCGG where everything is the same except that αi is increased, if E ′ is an equilibrium
of this new instance and ω′i is total resource allocated to pi in E ′, then ω′i ≥ ωi.
Proof: Without loss of generality assume all leafs of the tree are goods (because a leaf agent has
no choice but to allocate all her resources to the unique good she is connected to) and root the tree
at pi. Suppose ω
′
i < ωi. Since α
′
i > αi, it must be the case that there exists some agent aj ∈ N (pi)
who is allocating less resource on pi in E ′ than in E , this in turn implies that aj is allocating more
resource to some good pk ∈ N\{pi} in E ′ than in E . Therefore we have ωi ≤ ωk and ω′k ≤ ω′i and
thus ωk − ω′k ≥ ωi − ω′i > 0. If k is a leaf then this is obviously a contradiction. Otherwise, we can
continue the above reasoning recursively and eventually we will reach a contradiction by having
a leaf good whose total resource decreases in E ′ whereas at the same time its unique neighboring
agent is allocating more resources to it.
Theorem 6 The Nash equilibrium is strongly unique across all NCGG played on a given tree
G = (P,A,E), as long as Uj is increasing, convex and differentiable for any agent aj .
Proof: Again without loss of generality assume leafs are all goods. We have the following claim.
Claim. For any NCGG instance on a tree G = (A,P,E), if there is an equilibrium E where total
resource allocated is the same across all goods, then E is the strongly unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose E is not strongly unique. Let E ′ be a different Nash equilibrium. By Theorem
5 E ′ can only be weakly different from E . Since E and E ′ are weakly different there must exist
edge (pi, aj) such that aj is allocating different amount of resource in E and E ′; without loss of
generality, assume aj is allocating less resource in E ′ than in E . Root the tree at pi, then aj must
be allocating more resource in E ′ to one of its child pk ∈ N (aj)\{pi}. Note given the amount
of resource allocated by aj on pk, the game played at the subtree rooted at pk can be viewed as
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independent of the game played in the rest of the tree, by viewing the resource allocated by aj on
pk as part of the ground level of pk. Now that the ground level has increased, by Lemma 1 any
equilibrium on the subtree rooted at pk must not have the total resource allocated on pk decreased,
so we have ω′k ≥ ωk. If ω′k > ωk, then this is a contradiction to weak uniqueness. If ω′k = ωk, then
one of pk’s child must be allocating less resource to pk in E ′ than in E and we can repeat the above
reasoning recursively. Continue this process until we either reach the conclusion that E and E ′ are
strongly different, which is a contradiction, or reach a leaf good whose allocated resource in E ′ is
the same as that in E even when his unique neighboring agent is allocating more resource to it in
E ′, which is again a contradiction.
Resume Proof of Theorem. We prove this theorem by giving an induction on the size of the tree
N = |A| + |P |. First note the equilibrium is unique when N ≤ 2 (in the trivial case where either
E = ∅, the claim is vacuously true). Assume the theorem is true for any tree of size N ≤ K,
consider the case N = K + 1.
For any instance GK+1 with N = K+1, let E be a Nash equilibrium (whose existence is implied
by Theorem 4). We want to show that E is strongly unique. Let
E(E) = {(pi, aj) | ωi > ωk and xjk > 0 in E}
If E(E) = ∅ then it must be the case that the total resource allocated is the same across all goods,
and by the above claim E is thus strongly unique and we are through. Otherwise, partition G
into subtrees by removing E(E) from E. Note the size of each subtree thus resulted is at most
N , so by induction they each has a strongly unique equilibrium; this implies that if we can prove
E(E ′) = E(E) for any equilibrium E ′, then E ′ = E and we are again through. To this end, suppose
GK+1 has a weakly different equilibrium E ′ such that (pi, aj) ∈ E(E) and (pi, aj) /∈ E(E ′) and
consider the following two cases.
Case I: aj is allocating resource to pi in E ′. Consider the game played on the subtree of
GK+1 rooted at pi and not containing aj . Since aj allocates more resource on pi in E ′ than in E ,
by Lemma 1 ω′i ≥ ωi. On the other hand, aj must be allocating less resource to some other good
pk in E ′ than in E , so again by Lemma 1 ωk ≥ ω′k. Note we also have ωi > ωk and thus conclude
that ω′i > ω
′
k; since aj allocates non-zero resource to pi in E ′, she is not acting optimally and this
gives a contradiction to the fact that E ′ is an equilibrium.
Case II: aj is not allocating resource to pi in E ′. Since the subtree rooted at pi and not
containing aj is of size at most N−1, by induction we have ωi = ω′i. Since aj is allocating the same
total amount of resource to N (aj)\pi, there exists pk on which aj is allocating nonzero resource
in E and not allocating strictly more resource in E ′ than in E ; by Lemma 1 this implies ω′k ≤ ωk.
Note we also have ωi > ωk because (pi, aj) ∈ E(E), and thus we have ω′i > ω′k. Consider the
following two cases: Case 1) If aj allocates nonzero resource to pk in E ′ then ω′i = ω′k because
(pi, aj) /∈ E(E ′); but this is a contradiction. Case 2) If aj allocates zero resource to pk then there
exists good pl ∈ N (aj)\{pi, pk} on which aj is allocating strictly more resource in E ′ than in E .
The fact that (pi, aj) /∈ E(E ′) implies ω′i = ω′l, so we have ω′l > ω′k; but this is a contradiction to
the fact that E ′ is an equilibrium.
Now we conclude that E(E) = E(E ′) and this completes the proof.
4 Nash Dynamics
Pick any utility function that is increasing, concave and differentiable, say U(x) = √x, and define
potential function Ψ(ω1, ..., ωn) =
∑n
i=1
√
ωi. It is clear that for any agent aj, whenever aj updates
her allocation such that increases her total utility, the potential increases as well. This proves the
following theorem.
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Theorem 7 NCGG is a potential game.
Therefore, better/best response Nash dynamics always converge. However it is not clear how
fast the convergence is as the increment in aj ’s total utility can be either larger or smaller than the
increment of the potential, depending both on Uj(·) and the amount of resources already allocated
to aj’s neighboring goods. In the rest of the section, we present a particular Nash dynamics where
we can show fast convergence to an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium. We only give details for the
best response Nash dynamics (Algorithm 1), and it is easy to see the same convergence result holds
for the corresponding better response Nash dynamics as well. To this end we consider K-discretized
version of the game, where each agent has access to a total of K identical atomic resources, each
of volume 1/K. We start by giving the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 A solution to the K-discretized CGP is optimal iff the following two conditions are
satisfied: 1) the agent has allocated all of its K atomic units of resource; 2) for any two goods
pi, pj ∈ P , ωi − ωj > 1/K (where ωi = αi + xi and ωj = αj + xj) implies xi = 0.
Proof: First we prove the ‘only if’ direction. It is obvious that an optimal solution must have
allocated all of its K atomic units of resource because the utility function is increasing, so we focus
on the proof of the second condition. Suppose otherwise we have pi, pj ∈ P with ωi − ωj > 1/k,
where ωi = αi + xi, ωj = αj + xj and xi > 0. Construct another solution by moving one atomic
unit of resource from good pi to pj gives a new solution of total utility strictly higher because the
utility function is increasing and concave. Therefore we have a contradiction.
Next we prove the ‘if’ direction of the lemma. Suppose the solution x is not optimal. Let
ωk and ω
′
k (where pk ∈ P ) denote the total resource induced by this ‘suboptimal’ solution and a
true optimal solution x′, respectively. Since an optimal solution must have allocated all of its K
units of atomic resource among the goods, it must be true that there exist pi, pj ∈ P such that
ωi − ω′i ≥ 1/K and ω′j − ωj ≥ 1/K, and if both inequality holds in equality, then ω′i 6= ωj (because
otherwise x and x′ are essentially the same, which means x is already optimal). Note ω′j−ωj ≥ 1/K
implies that good j′ has resource allocated to it in the optimal solution (i.e. x′j ≥ 1/K), so by the
‘only if’ part of proof above, we must have ω′i ≥ ω′j − 1/K. Now we show that ωi − ωj > 1/K by
considering the following two cases:
Case I: (ωi − ω′i) + (ω′j − ωj) > 2/K. In this case, it is easily checked that ωi − ωj > 1/K.
Case II: ωi − ω′i = 1/K and ω′j − ωj = 1/K. As discussed above, we must not have ω′i = ωj.
In fact, we must have ω′i > ωj because otherwise we will have ω
′
j = ωj +1/K > ω
′
i+1/K, which is
a contradiction to optimality because x′j ≥ 1/K. Therefore, again we have reached the conclusion
that ωi − ωj > 1/K.
Now note ωi−ω′i ≥ 1/K implies xi ≥ 1/K, but this is a contradiction to ωi−ωj > 1/K, which
by assumption implies xi = 0. Therefore, x must itself be an optimal solution.
Lemma 3 For any ǫ > 0, an optimal solution to the K-discretized common goods problem, where
K = 1/U−1(ǫ/n), is an ǫ-approximation to the optimal solution in the continuous common goods
problem.
Proof: Denote by OPT and OPTK the optimal utility attained by an optimal solution in the
continuous version and the K-discretized version, respectively; denote by W∗ and W∗K the set of
goods to which non-zero resource is allocated in the two optimal solutions, respectively. By Lemma
2, any two goods in W∗K must have their total resources allocated differ by at most 1/K, i.e.
ωmax − ωmin ≤ 1/K, where ωmin = min{ωi | pi ∈ W∗K} and ωmax = max{ωi | pi ∈ W∗K}. Since
the agent has access to n goods, it must be the case that ωmin ≥ 1/n − 1/K because otherwise
ωmax < 1/n. Now consider the set W = W∗K ∪ {pi /∈ W∗K | αi ≤ ωmax} of goods whose total
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Algorithm 1 K-discretized Best Response Nash Dynamics
1: // INPUT: G, α  0, ǫ > 0, and schedule σ
2: // OUTPUT: An ǫ-approximate Nash Equilibrium
3: Start by setting K = maxj∈[m] U−1j (ǫ/n))
4: // Set an arbitrary initial state s = (s1, s2, ..., sm)
5: for j = 1 to m do
6: aj discretizes his one unit of resource into 2K atomic units, each of volume 1/2K; arbitrarily
assigns them to her adjacent goods, resulting in sj
7: end for
8: // Sort in non-increasing order of total resource allocated
9: Arrange goods in the order pπ(1), pπ(2), ..., pπ(n) s.t. ωπ(i) ≥ ωπ(j) if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n
10: // Best response Nash Dynamics
11: for t = 1 to T do
12: Let aσ(t) be the agent active in round t;
13: while ∃ 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n s.t. ωπ(i) − ωπ(j) ≥ 1/K and xσ(t)π(i) > 0 do
14: xσ(t)π(i) = xσ(t)π(i) − 1/2K; xσ(t)π(j) = xσ(t)π(j) + 1/2K
15: If necessary, re-define π to maintain total resource allocated in non-increasing order.
16: end while
17: end for
resource is at most ωmax, it is clear that: 1) W∗, the optimal solution to the continuous version of
the problem, forms a subset of W; 2) max{ωi | i ∈ W∗} ≤ ωmax.
Now suppose we have access to an additional of |W| atomic units of resource, each of volume
1/K, construct a new allocation by doing the following: Start with an allocation same asW∗K , then
assign one atomic unit of resource to each good in W ⊇W∗K . It is clear from the above discussion
that for any good pi ∈ W, its total resource under the new allocation is at least that of the total
resource allocated under W∗, which means the utility that we obtain under the new allocation,
OPT ′′, is at least OPT . Therefore OPT − OPTK ≤ OPT ′′ − OPTK ≤ nU(1/K); so to upper
bound OPT −OPTK by ǫ, it is sufficient to set K = 1/U−1(ǫ/n).
Note for most reasonable choices of U (e.g. U(x) = xp where p ∈ (0, 1)), K is polynomial in n.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 8 For any ǫ > 0, Algorithm 1 converges to an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in
O(Kmn) time, where K = maxj∈[m] U−1j (ǫ/n)), for any updating schedule σ.2
Proof: First note according to the characterization of Lemma 2, the response of each agent aσ(t)
in Algorithm 1 is a K-discretized best response. The rest of this proof is to define a potential
function3 whose range are positive integers that span an interval no greater than Kmn, and to
show each time an agent updates his allocation with a best response, the value of this potential
function strictly decreases.
For simplicity of exposition, we write pi in place of pπ(i) in the rest of the proof. Let p1, p2, ..., pn
be the n goods arranged in non-increasing order of total resource allocated, that is, ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥ ... ≥
ωn. Define potential function Φ(ω1, ω2, ..., ωn) =
∑n
i=1(n − i) · ωi. Apparently, Φ(·) is a positive
integer valued function and the difference between the greatest and smallest function value is upper
bounded by Kmn. We are done if we can show that for any node aσ(t), the computation that aσ(t)
does on line 13-17 of Algorithm 1 results in a strict decrease in the potential.
2
σ is assumed to at any time only pick an agent whose state is not already a best-response.
3This potential function is different from the one given in the proof of Theorem 7; this new potential function is
convenient in upper bounding the convergence time.
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On line 14-15 of Algorithm 1, an atomic unit of resource of volume 1/2K is moved from good pi
to pj. In doing so, the goods may no longer be sorted in non-increasing order of total resource, and
in this case we restore it on line 16 of Algorithm 1, which without loss of generality can be thought
of as moving pi to the right for some µ ≥ 0 positions (with µ being the minimum necessary), and
moving pj to the left in the ordering for some ν ≥ 0 positions (again with ν being the minimum
necessary). This results in the new ordering of the goods:
p1, ..., pi−1, pi+1, ..., pi+µ, pi, ..., pj , pj−ν, ..., pj−1, pj+1, ..., pn
Note pi still precedes pj (i.e. i + µ < j − ν) in this ordering because prior to line 14-15 of
Algorithm 1, ωi − ωj ≥ 1/K, therefore, the total resource of pi is still at least that of pj after a
1/2K amount of resource has been moved from pi to pj. With this observation, we can analyze
the change in potential by looking at the changes of potential on {pi, ..., pi+µ} and {pj−ν , ..., pj}
separately, and ignore the rest of the goods, whose contribution to potential remain unchanged.
Clearly, the contribution to potential from {pi, ..., pi+µ} decreases, and by an amount of ∆Φ↓ =
(ωi−ωi+1) ·(n−i)+(ωi+1−ωi+2) ·(n−i−1) + ...+(ωi+µ−ωi+1/2K) ·(n−i−µ) ≥ (n−i−µ)/2K.
Similarly, the contribution to potential from {pj−ν , ..., pj} increases by ∆Φ↑ = (ωj−1 − ωj) · (n −
j) + (ωj−2 − ωj−1) · (n− j + 1) + ...+ (ωj + 1/2K − ωj−ν) · (n− j + ν) ≤ (n− j + ν)/2K. Since
i+ µ < j − ν, we have ∆Φ↓ > ∆Φ↑, which means the potential decrease by at least 1. Therefore,
in at most Kmn steps Algorithm 1 converges to a Nash equilibrium in the K-discretized game. By
Lemma 3, this constitutes an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium to the original game.
5 Price of Anarchy of the Game
We show in this section the price of anarchy of NCGG is unbounded, and it is for a reason that
echoes the well-known phenomenon called tragedy of the commons [11].
Theorem 9 The price of anarchy of NCGG is Ω(n1−ǫ), for any ǫ > 0.
Proof: Consider the bipartite graph G = (P,A,E) where P = {pc, p1, ..., pn}, A = {a1, ..., an} and
E = {(pj , aj), (pc, aj) | j ∈ [n]} so that all agents share the ‘common’ good pc and each agent aj
has a ‘private’ good pj to himself. Assume each agent aj has the same utility function U , αi = 0
∀ ai ∈ {p1, ..., pn} and αc = 1.
It is clear that it is a Nash equilibrium for every agent aj to allocate her entire unit of resource
to her private good pj. And in this case the social welfare is 2n · U(1). On the other hand, if every
agent devotes her entire unit of resource to the common good, then the social welfare is n ·U(n+1).
Therefore the price of anarchy of this particular example is at least U(n+1)2U(1) = O(U(n + 1)). Since
U(·) is concave, we can set U(x) = x1−ǫ; therefore the theorem follows.
References
[1] M. S. Bansal, and V. Ch. Venkaiah. Improved fully polynomial time approximation scheme for
the 0-1 multiple-choice knapsack problem. In Proc. of SIAM Conference on Discrete Mathe-
matics, 2004.
[2] S. P. Boyd, and L. Vandenberghe. Convex optimization. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[3] Y. Bramoulle´, and R. E. Kranton. Public goods in networks. Journal of Economic Theory,
135(1):478-494, 2007.
11
[4] E. Even-Dar, M. Kearns, and S. Suri. A network formation game for bipartite exchange
economies. In Proc. of ACM SODA’07, 697-706, 2007.
[5] E. Eisenberg, and D. Gale. Consensus of subjective probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel method.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 30:165-168, 1959.
[6] M. Feldman, K. Lai, and L. Zhang. A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for
distributed shared clusters. In Proc. of ACM EC’05, 127-136, 2005.
[7] I. Fisher. PhD thesis. Yale University, 1891.
[8] A. V. Fol’gardt. Solution of a resource allocation game. Computational Mathematics and Mod-
eling, 4(3):273-274, 1993.
[9] A. V. Fol’gardt. Games with allocation of discrete resources to several sites. Computational
Mathematics and Modeling, 6(3):172-176, 1995.
[10] M. X. Goemans, E. L. Li, V. S. Mirrokni, and M. Thottan. Market sharing games applied to
content distribution in ad-hoc networks. In Proc. of MobiHoc’04, 55-66, 2004.
[11] G. Hardin. Tragedy of the commons. Science, 162:1243-1248, 1968.
[12] J. H. Kagel, and A. E. Roth (eds.) The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1995.
[13] S. M. Kakade, M. J. Kearns, L. E. Ortiz, R. Pemantle, and S. Suri. Economic properties of
social networks. In Proc. of NIPS’04, 2004.
[14] H. Kellerer, U. Pferschy, and D. Pisinger. Knapsack problems. Springer, 2004.
[15] S. Martello, and P. Toth. Knapsack problems: Algorithms and computer implementation. John
Wiley and Sons, 1990.
[16] D. Monderer, and L. S. Shapley, Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:124-143,
1996.
[17] C. Papadimitriou. Algorithms, games, and the Internet. In Proc. of STOC’01, 749 - 753, 2001.
[18] L. Zhang. The efficiency and fairness of a fixed budget resource allocation game. In Proc. of
ICALP’05, 485-496, 2005.
12
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Let λi (i = 1, 2, ..., n) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint
xi ≥ 0 and ν the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equality constraint
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. Since
the above program is convex, the following KKT optimality conditions,
λ∗i ≥ 0, x∗i ≥ 0 (i ∈ [n]) (2a)
n∑
i=1
x∗i = 1 (2b)
λ∗i x
∗
i = 0 (i ∈ [n]) (2c)
− d
dxi
U(αi + x∗i )− λ∗i + ν∗ = 0 (i ∈ [n]) (2d)
are sufficient and necessary for x∗ to be the optimal solution to the (primal) convex program (1)
and (λ∗, ν∗) the optimal solution to the associated dual program.
Let V be the inverse function of ddtU . Note equation (2c) and (2d) implies (− ddxiU(αi + x∗i ) +
ν∗)x∗i = 0; equation (2a) and (2d) implies − ddxiU(αi+x∗i )+ν∗ ≥ 0, which combing with the fact that
U(·) is convex implies V(ν∗) ≤ αi+x∗i . If αi < V(ν∗), then x∗i > 0 and thus − ddxiU(αi+x∗i )+ν∗ = 0,
i.e. x∗i = V(ν∗)−αi. On the other hand, if αi ≥ V(ν∗), then we must have x∗i = 0. To see why this
is true, suppose otherwise x∗i > 0; this leads to x
∗
i = V(ν∗)− αi ≤ 0, which is a contradiction. We
summarize the optimal solution x∗ as follows
x∗i =
{
V(ν∗)− αi αi < V(ν∗)
0 αi ≥ V(ν∗)
where ν∗ is a solution to
∑n
i=1max {0,V(ν∗)− αi} = 1.
It is easy to see that
∑n
i=1max {0,V(ν∗)− αi} = 1 admits a unique solution if we treat V(ν∗)
as the variable, i.e. different utility functions only leads to different solutions of the Lagrange
multiplier ν∗ but V(ν∗) remains invariant. Therefore the optimal solution x∗ is unique not only
of a particular choice of U(·), but across all utility functions that are increasing, concave and
differentiable.
13
